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ABSTRACT
We show that prospect theory offers a rich theory of casino gambling, one that captures several features
of actual gambling behavior. First, we demonstrate that, for a wide range of preference parameter values,
a prospect theory agent would be willing to gamble in a casino even if the casino only offers bets with
no skewness and with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that the probability weighting
embedded in prospect theory leads to a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment he enters a casino,
the agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy; but after he starts playing, he wants to switch
to a different strategy. The model therefore predicts heterogeneity in gambling behavior: how a gambler
behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on whether
he can commit in advance to his initial plan of action.
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Casino gambling is a hugely popular activity. The American Gaming Association reports
that, in 2007, 55 million people made 376 million trips to casinos in the United States alone.
If we are to fully understand how people think about risk, we need to make sense of the
existence and popularity of casino gambling. Unfortunately, there are still very few models
of why people go to casinos or of how they behave when they get there. The challenge is
clear. In the ﬁeld of economics, the standard model of decision-making under risk couples
the expected utility framework with a concave utility function deﬁned over wealth. This
model is helpful for understanding a range of phenomena. It cannot, however, explain casino
gambling: an agent with a concave utility function will always turn down a wealth bet with
a negative expected value.
While casino gambling is not consistent with the standard economic model of risk atti-
tudes, researchers have made some progress in understanding it better. One approach is to
introduce non-concave segments into the utility function (Friedman and Savage, 1948). A
second approach argues that people derive a separate component of utility from gambling.
This utility may be only indirectly related to the bets themselves – for example, it may stem
from the social pleasure of going to a casino with friends – or it may be directly related to
the bets, in that the gambler enjoys the feeling of suspense as he waits for the bets to play
out (Conlisk, 1993). A third approach suggests that gamblers are simply unaware that the
odds they are facing are unfavorable.
In this paper, we present a new model of casino gambling based on Tversky and Kahne-
man’s (1992) cumulative prospect theory. Cumulative prospect theory, a prominent theory of
decision-making under risk, is a modiﬁed version of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory. It posits that people evaluate risk using a value function that is deﬁned over gains
and losses, that is concave over gains and convex over losses, and that is kinked at the origin,
so that people are more sensitive to losses than to gains, a feature known as loss aversion. It
also states that people engage in “probability weighting”: that they use transformed rather
than objective probabilities, where the transformed probabilities are obtained from objective
probabilities by applying a weighting function. The main eﬀect of the weighting function is
to overweight the tails of the distribution it is applied to. The overweighting of tails does
not represent a bias in beliefs; rather, it is a way of capturing the common preference for a
lottery-like, or positively skewed, payoﬀ.1
1Although our model is based on the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) rather
than on the original prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we will sometimes refer to cumulative
2We choose prospect theory as the basis for a possible explanation of casino gambling
because we would like to understand gambling in a framework that also explains other
evidence on risk attitudes. Prospect theory can explain a wide range of experimental evidence
on attitudes to risk – indeed, it was designed to – and it can also shed light on much ﬁeld
evidence on risk-taking: for example, it can address a number of facts about risk premia
in asset markets (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis and Huang, 2008). By oﬀering a
prospect theory model of casino gambling, our paper therefore suggests that gambling is not
an isolated phenomenon requiring its own unique explanation, but that it may instead be
one of a family of facts that can be understood using a single model of risk attitudes.
The idea that prospect theory might explain casino gambling is initially surprising.
Through the overweighting of the tails of distributions, prospect theory can easily explain
why people buy lottery tickets. However, many casino games oﬀer gambles that, aside from
their low expected values, are also much less skewed than a lottery ticket. It is therefore far
from clear that probability weighting can explain why these gambles are so popular. Indeed,
given that prospect theory agents are much more sensitive to losses than to gains, one would
think that they would ﬁnd these gambles very unappealing. Initially, then, prospect theory
does not seem to be a promising starting point for a model of casino gambling.
In this paper, we show that, in fact, prospect theory can oﬀer a rich theory of casino
gambling, one that captures several features of actual gambling behavior. First, we demon-
strate that, for a wide range of preference parameter values, a prospect theory agent would
be willing to gamble in a casino, even if the casino only oﬀers bets with no skewness and
with zero or negative expected value. Second, we show that prospect theory – in particular,
its probability weighting feature – predicts a plausible time inconsistency: at the moment
he enters a casino, a prospect theory agent plans to follow one particular gambling strategy;
but after he starts playing, he wants to switch to a diﬀerent strategy. How he behaves there-
fore depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency; and, if he is aware of it, on
whether he is able to commit in advance to his initial plan of action.
What is the intuition for why, in spite of his loss aversion, a prospect theory agent might
still be willing to enter a casino? Consider a casino that oﬀers only zero expected value bets
– speciﬁcally, 50:50 bets to win or lose some ﬁxed amount $h – and suppose that the agent
makes decisions by maximizing the cumulative prospect theory value of his accumulated
winnings or losses at the moment he leaves the casino. We show that, if the agent enters the
casino, his preferred plan is usually to keep gambling if he is winning, but to stop gambling
prospect theory as “prospect theory” for short.
3and leave the casino if he starts accumulating losses. An important property of this plan is
that, even though the casino oﬀers only 50:50 bets, the distribution of the agent’s perceived
overall casino winnings becomes positively skewed: by stopping once he starts accumulating
losses, the agent limits his downside; and by continuing to gamble when he is winning, he
retains substantial upside.
At this point, the probability weighting feature of prospect theory plays an important
role. Under probability weighting, the agent overweights the tails of probability distribu-
tions. With suﬃcient probability weighting, then, the agent may like the positively skewed
distribution generated by his planned gambling strategy. We show that, for a wide range of
preference parameter values, the probability weighting eﬀect indeed outweighs the loss aver-
sion eﬀect and the agent is willing to enter the casino. In other words, while the prospect
theory agent would always turn down the basic 50:50 bet if it were oﬀered in isolation,h ei s
nonetheless willing to enter the casino because, through a speciﬁc choice of exit strategy, he
gives his overall casino experience a positively skewed distribution, one which, with suﬃcient
probability weighting, he ﬁnds attractive.
Prospect theory oﬀers more than just an explanation of why people go to casinos; it also
predicts a time inconsistency. The inconsistency is a consequence of probability weighting:
it arises because, as time passes, the probabilities of ﬁnal outcomes change, which, in turn,
means that the degree to which the agent under- or overweights these outcomes also changes.
For example, when he enters the casino, the agent knows that the probability of winning
ﬁve bets in a row, and hence of accumulating a total of $5h, is very low, namely
1
32. Under
probability weighting, a low probability outcome like this is overweighted. If the agent
actually wins the ﬁrst four bets, however, the probability of winning the ﬁfth bet, and hence
of accumulating $5h,i sn o w1
2. Under probability weighting, a moderate probability outcome
like this is under-weighted.
The fact that some ﬁnal outcomes are initially overweighted but subsequently under-
weighted, or vice-versa, means that the agent’s preferences over gambling strategies change
over time. We noted above, that, at the moment he enters a casino, the agent’s preferred
plan is usually to keep gambling if he is winning but to stop gambling if he starts accumu-
lating losses. We show, however, that once he starts playing, he wants to do the opposite:
to keep gambling if he is losing and to stop if he accumulates a signiﬁcant gain.
As a result of this time inconsistency, our model predicts heterogeneity in gambling
behavior. How a gambler behaves depends on whether he is aware of the time inconsistency.
A gambler who is aware of the time inconsistency has an incentive to try to commit to his
4initial plan of action. For gamblers who are aware of the time inconsistency, then, their
behavior further depends on whether they are indeed able to ﬁnd a commitment device.
To study these distinctions, we consider three types of agents. The ﬁrst type is “naive”:
he is unaware of the time inconsistency. This agent typically plans to keep gambling if he
is winning and to stop if he starts accumulating losses. After he starts playing, however, he
deviates from this plan and instead gambles as long as possible when he is losing and stops
if he accumulates a signiﬁcant gain.
The second type of agent is “sophisticated” – he is aware of the time inconsistency – but
is unable to ﬁnd a way of committing to his initial plan. He therefore knows that, if he enters
the casino, he will keep gambling if he is losing and will stop if he makes some gains. This
will give his overall casino experience a negatively skewed distribution. Since he overweights
the tails of probability distributions, he almost always ﬁnds this unattractive and therefore
refuses to enter the casino in the ﬁrst place.
The third type of agent is also sophisticated but is able to ﬁnd a way of committing to his
initial plan. Just like the naive agent, this agent typically plans, on entering the casino, to
keep gambling if he is winning and to stop if he starts accumulating losses. Unlike the naive
agent, however, he is able, through the use of a commitment device, to stick to this plan. For
example, he may bring only a small amount of cash to the casino while also leaving his ATM
card at home; this guarantees that he will indeed leave the casino if he starts accumulating
losses.
In summary, under the view proposed in this paper, the popularity of casinos is driven
by two aspects of our psychological makeup: ﬁrst, by the tendency to overweight the tails
of distributions, which makes even the small chance of a large win seem very alluring; and
second, by what we could call “naivete,” namely the failure to recognize that, after starting
to gamble, we may deviate from our initial plan of action.
Our model is a complement to existing theories of gambling, not a replacement. For
example, we suspect that the concept of “utility of gambling” plays at least as large a role
in casinos as does prospect theory. At the same time, we think that prospect theory can add
signiﬁcantly to our understanding of casino gambling. As noted above, one attractive feature
of the prospect theory approach is that it not only explains why people go to casinos, but
also oﬀers a rich description of what they do once they get there. In particular, it explains
a number of features of casino gambling that have not emerged from earlier models: the
tendency to gamble longer than planned when losing, the strategy of leaving one’s ATM
card at home, and casinos’ practice of issuing vouchers for free food and accommodation to
5people who are winning.2
In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in the time inconsistency that stems
from hyperbolic discounting. In this paper, we study a diﬀerent time inconsistency, one
generated by probability weighting. The prior literature oﬀers very little guidance on how
best to analyze this particular inconsistency. We present an approach that we think is simple
and natural; but other approaches are certainly possible.
Our focus is on the “demand” side of casino gambling: we posit a casino structure and
study a prospect theory agent’s reaction to it. In Section 4.2, we brieﬂy discuss an analysis of
the “supply” side – of what kinds of gambles we should expect to see oﬀered in an economy
with prospect theory agents. However, we defer a full analysis of the supply side to future
research.3
2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
In this section, we review the elements of cumulative prospect theory. Readers who are
already familiar with this theory may prefer to go directly to Section 3.
Consider the gamble
(x−m,p −m;...;x−1,p −1;x0,p 0;x1,p 1;...;xn,p n), (1)
to be read as “gain x−m with probability p−m, x−m+1 with probability p−m+1,a n ds oo n ,
independent of other risks,” where xi <x j for i<j , x0 =0 ,a n d
 n
i=−m pi =1 . I nt h e




piU(W + xi), (2)





2It would be interesting to incorporate an explicit utility of gambling into the model we present below.
The only reason we do not do so is because we want to understand the predictions of prospect theory, taken
alone.
3A sizeable literature in medical science studies “pathological gambling,” a disorder which aﬀects about
1% of gamblers. Our paper is not aimed at understanding such extreme gambling behavior, but rather the






w(pi + ...+ pn) − w(pi+1 + ...+ pn)
w(p−m + ...+ pi) − w(p−m + ...+ pi−1)
for
0 ≤ i ≤ n
−m ≤ i<0
, (4)
and where v(·)a n dw(·) are known as the value function and the probability weighting













(P δ +( 1− P)δ)1/δ, (6)
where α, δ ∈ (0,1) and λ>1. The left panel in Figure 1 plots the value function in (5) for
α =0 .5a n dλ =2 .5. The right panel in the ﬁgure plots the weighting function in (6) for
δ =0 .4 (the dashed line), for δ =0 .65 (the solid line), and for δ = 1, which corresponds to no
probability weighting at all (the dotted line). Note that v(0) = 0, w(0) = 0, and w(1) = 1.
There are four important diﬀerences between (2) and (3). First, the carriers of value in
cumulative prospect theory are gains and losses, not ﬁnal wealth levels: the argument of v(·)
in (3) is xi,n o tW + xi. Second, while U(·) is typically concave everywhere, v(·)i sc o n c a v e
only over gains; over losses, it is convex. This captures the experimental ﬁnding that people
tend to be risk averse over moderate-probability gains – they prefer a certain gain of $500 to
($1000,
1
2) – but risk-seeking over moderate-probability losses, in that they prefer (−$1000,
1
2)
to a certain loss of $500.5 The degree of concavity over gains and of convexity over losses are
both governed by the parameter α; a lower value of α means greater concavity over gains
and greater convexity over losses. Using experimental data, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
estimate α =0 .88 for their median subject.
Third, while U(·) is typically diﬀerentiable everywhere, the value function v(·)i sk i n k e d
at the origin so that the agent is more sensitive to losses – even small losses – than to gains
of the same magnitude. As noted in the Introduction, this element of cumulative prospect
theory is known as loss aversion and is designed to capture the widespread aversion to bets
such as ($110, 1
2;−$100, 1
2). The severity of the kink is determined by the parameter λ;a
higher value of λ implies a greater relative sensitivity to losses. Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) estimate λ =2 .25 for their median subject.
Finally, under cumulative prospect theory, the agent does not use objective probabilities
4When i = n and i = −m, equation (4) reduces to πn = w(pn)a n dπ−m = w(p−m), respectively.
5We abbreviate (x,p;0,q)t o( x,p).
7when evaluating a gamble, but rather, transformed probabilities obtained from objective
probabilities via the weighting function w(·). Equation (4) shows that, to obtain the prob-
ability weight πi for an outcome xi ≥ 0, we take the total probability of all outcomes equal
to or better than xi,n a m e l ypi + ...+ pn, the total probability of all outcomes strictly
better than xi,n a m e l ypi+1 + ...+ pn, apply the weighting function to each, and compute
the diﬀerence. To obtain the probability weight for an outcome xi < 0, we take the total
probability of all outcomes equal to or worse than xi, the total probability of all outcomes
strictly worse than xi, apply the weighting function to each, and compute the diﬀerence.6
The main consequence of the probability weighting in (4) and (6) is that the agent
overweights the tails of any distribution he faces. In equations (3)-(4), the most extreme
outcomes, x−m and xn, are assigned the probability weights w(p−m)a n dw(pn), respectively.
For the functional form in (6) and for δ ∈ (0,1), w(P) >Pfor low, positive P;t h er i g h t
panel of Figure 1 illustrates this for δ =0 .4a n dδ =0 .65. If p−m and pn are small, then, we
have w(p−m) >p −m and w(pn) >p n, so that the most extreme outcomes – the outcomes in
the tails – are overweighted.
The overweighting of tails in (4) and (6) is designed to capture the simultaneous demand
many people have for both lotteries and insurance. For example, subjects typically prefer
($5000,0.001) to a certain $5, but also prefer a certain loss of $5 to (−$5000,0.001). By over-
weighting the tail probability of 0.001 suﬃciently, cumulative prospect theory can capture
both of these choices. The degree to which the agent overweights tails is governed by the
parameter δ; a lower value of δ implies more overweighting of tails. Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) estimate δ =0 .65 for their median subject. To ensure the monotonicity of w(·), we
require δ ∈ (0.28,1).7
We emphasize that the transformed probabilities in (3)-(4) do not represent erroneous be-
liefs: in Tversky and Kahneman’s framework, an agent evaluating the lottery-like ($5000,0.001)
gamble knows that the probability of receiving the $5000 is exactly 0.001. Rather, the trans-
formed probabilities are decision weights that capture the experimental evidence on risk
attitudes – for example, the preference for the lottery over a certain $5.
6The main diﬀerence between cumulative prospect theory and the original prospect theory in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) is that, in the original version, the weighting function w(·) is applied to the probability
density function rather than to the cumulative probability distribution. By applying the weighting function to
the cumulative distribution, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ensure that cumulative prospect theory satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance property. The original prospect theory, by contrast, does not satisfy
this property.
7To be precise, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) allow the value of δ to depend on whether the outcome
that is being assigned a probability weight is a gain or a loss. They estimate δ =0 .61 for gain outcomes and
δ =0 .69 for loss outcomes. For simplicity, we use the same value of δ for both gain and loss outcomes and
take its median estimate to be the average of 0.61 and 0.69, namely 0.65.
83 A Model of Casino Gambling
In the United States, the term “gambling” typically refers to one of four things: (i) casino
gambling, of which the most popular forms are slot machines and the card game of blackjack;
(ii) the buying of lottery tickets; (iii) pari-mutuel betting on horses at racetracks; and (iv)
ﬁxed-odds betting through bookmakers on sports such as football, baseball, basketball, and
hockey. The American Gaming Association estimates the 2007 revenues from the four types
of gambling at $60 billion, $24 billion, $4 billion, and $200 million, respectively.8
While the four types of gambling listed above have some common characteristics, they
also diﬀer in some ways. Casino gambling diﬀers from playing the lottery in that casino
games oﬀer bets that are typically much less positively skewed than a lottery. And it diﬀers
from racetrack-betting and sports-betting in that casino games usually require less skill.
In this paper, we focus on casino gambling, largely because, from the perspective of
prospect theory, it seems particularly hard to explain. The buying of lottery tickets is already
captured by prospect theory through the overweighting of tail probabilities. However, since
casino games oﬀer bets that are much less positively skewed than lotteries, it is not at all
clear that we can use the overweighting of tails to explain their popularity.
We model a casino in the following way. There are T +1d a t e s ,t =0 ,1,...,T.A tt i m e
0, the casino oﬀers the agent a 50:50 bet to win or lose a ﬁxed amount $h. If the agent turns
the gamble down, the game is over: he is oﬀered no more gambles and we say that he has
declined to enter the casino. If the agent accepts the 50:50 bet, we say that he has agreed to
enter the casino. The gamble is then played out and, at time 1, the outcome is announced.
At that time, the casino oﬀers the agent another 50:50 bet to win or lose $h. If he turns it
down, the game is over: the agent settles his account and leaves the casino. If he accepts the
gamble, it is played out and, at time 2, the outcome is announced. The game then continues
in the same way. If, at time t ∈ [0,T−2], the agent agrees to play a 50:50 bet to win or lose
$h, then, at time t+1, he is oﬀered another such bet and must either accept it or decline it.
If he declines it, the game is over: he settles his account and leaves the casino. At time T,
the agent must leave the casino if he has not already done so. We think of the interval from
0t oT as an evening of play.
We assume that there is an exogeneous date, date T, at which the agent must leave
the casino if he has not already done so because we think that this makes the model more
8The $200 million ﬁgure corresponds to sports-betting through legal bookmakers. It is widely believed
that this ﬁgure is dwarfed by the revenues from illegal sports-betting. Also excluded from these ﬁgures are
the revenues from online gambling.
9realistic: whether because of fatigue or because of work and family commitments, most
people cannot stay in a casino indeﬁnitely.9
Of the major casino games, it is blackjack that most closely matches the game in our
model: for a player familiar with the basic strategy, the odds of winning a round of blackjack
are close to 0.5. Slot machines oﬀer a positively skewed payoﬀ and therefore, at ﬁrst sight,
do not appear to ﬁt the model as neatly. Later, however, we argue that our analysis may be
able to shed as much light on slot machines as it does on blackjack.
In the discussion that follows, it will be helpful to think of the casino as a binomial tree.
Figure 2 illustrates this for T = 5 – ignore the arrows, for now. Each column of nodes in
the tree corresponds to a particular time: the left-most node corresponds to time 0 and the
right-most column to time T. At time 0, then, the agent starts in the left-most node. If he
takes the time 0 bet and wins, he moves one step up and to the right; if he takes the time 0
bet and loses, he moves one step down and to the right, and so on: whenever the agent wins
a bet, he moves up a step in the tree, and whenever he loses, he moves down a step. The
various nodes in any given column therefore represent the diﬀerent possible accumulated
winnings or losses at that time.
We refer to each node in the tree by a pair of numbers (t,j). The ﬁrst number, t,w h i c h
ranges from 0 to T, indicates the time that the node corresponds to. The second number,
j, which, for given t, ranges from 1 to t + 1, indicates how far down the node is within the
column of nodes that corresponds to time t: the highest node in the column corresponds to
j = 1 and the lowest node to j = t + 1. The left-most node in the tree is therefore node
(0,1). The two nodes in the column immediately to the right, starting from the top, are
nodes (1,1) and (1,2); and so on.
Throughout the paper, we use a simple color scheme to represent the agent’s behavior.
If a node is white, this means that, at that node, the agent agrees to play a 50:50 bet. If
the node is black, this means that the agent does not p l a ya5 0 : 5 0b e ta tt h a tn o d e ,e i t h e r
because he leaves the casino when he arrives at that node, or because his actions in earlier
rounds prevent him from even reaching that node. For example, the interpretation of Figure
2 is that the agent agrees to enter the casino at time 0 and then keeps gambling until time
T =5o ru n t i lh eh i t sn o d e( 3 ,1), whichever comes ﬁrst. The fact that node (3,1) has a
black color immediately implies that node (4,1) must also have a black color: a node that
can only be reached by passing through a black node must itself be black.
As noted above, the basic gamble oﬀered by the casino in our model is a 50:50 bet to
9We discuss an inﬁnite horizon analog of the ﬁnite horizon model in Section 4.4.
10win or lose $h. We assume that the gain and the loss are equally likely only because this
simpliﬁes the exposition, not because it is necessary for our analysis. Indeed, we have studied
the case where, as in actual casinos, the basic gamble has a somewhat negative expected
value – for example, where it entails a 0.46 chance of winning $h, say, and a 0.54 chance of
losing $h – and ﬁnd that the results are similar to those that we present below.
Now that we have described the structure of the casino, we are ready to present the
behavioral assumption that drives our analysis. Speciﬁcally, we assume that, at each moment
of time, the agent in our model decides what to do by maximizing the cumulative prospect
theory value of his accumulated winnings or losses at the moment he leaves the casino,w h e r e
the cumulative prospect theory value of a distribution is given by (3)-(6).
In any application of prospect theory, a key step is to specify the argument of the prospect
theory value function v(·), in other words, the “gain” or “loss” that the agent applies the value
function to. As noted in the previous paragraph, our assumption is that, at each moment of
time, the agent applies the value function to his overall winnings at the moment he leaves
the casino. In the language of “reference points,” our assumption is that, throughout the
evening of gambling, the agent’s reference point remains ﬁxed at his initial wealth when he
entered the casino, so that the argument of the value function is his wealth when he leaves
the casino minus his wealth when he entered.
Our modeling choice is motivated by the way people discuss their casino experiences. If
a friend or colleague tells us that he recently went to a casino, we tend to ask him “How
much did you win?,” not “How much did you win last year in all your casino visits?” or
“How much did you win in each of the games you played at the casino?” In other words, it
is overall winnings during a single casino visit that seem to be the focus of attention.
Our behavioral assumption immediately raises an important issue, one that plays a central
role in our analysis. This is the fact that cumulative prospect theory – in particular, its
probability weighting feature – generates a time inconsistency: the agent’s plan,a tt i m et,a s
to what he would do if he reached some later node is not necessarily what he actually does
when he reaches that node.
To see the intuition, consider the node indicated by an arrow in the upper part of the
t r e ei nF i g u r e2 ,n a m e l yn o d e( 4 ,1) – ignore the speciﬁc black or white node colorations –
and suppose that the per-period bet size is h = $10. It is possible to check that, from the
perspective of time 0, the agent’s preferred plan, for almost all preference parameter values,
i st og a m b l ei nn o d e( 4 ,1), should he arrive in that node. The reason is that, by gambling in
node (4,1), he gives himself a chance of leaving the casino in node (5,1) with an overall gain
11of $50. From the perspective of time 0, this gain has low probability, namely
1
32, but, under
cumulative prospect theory, low tail probabilities are overweighted, making node (5,1) very
appealing to the agent. In spite of the concavity of the value function v(·) in the region of
gains, then, his preferred plan, as of time 0, is almost always to gamble in node (4,1), should
he reach that node.
While the agent’s preferred plan, as of time 0, is to gamble in node (4,1), it is easy to
see that, if he actually arrives in node (4,1), he will instead stop gambling, contrary to his
initial plan. If he stops gambling in node (4,1), he leaves the casino with an overall gain of
$40. If he continues gambling, he has a 0.5 chance of an overall gain of $50 and a 0.5 chance








in words, if the cumulative prospect theory value of leaving is greater than or equal to the
cumulative prospect theory value of staying. Condition (7) simpliﬁes to




It is straightforward to check that condition (8) holds for all α, δ ∈ (0,1), so that the
agent indeed leaves the casino in node (4,1), contrary to his initial plan. What is the
intuition? From the perspective of time 0, node (5,1) was unlikely, overweighted, and hence
appealing. From the time 4 perspective, however, it is no longer unlikely: once the agent
is at node (4,1), the probability of reaching node (5,1) is 0.5. The weighting function w(·)
underweights moderate probabilities like 0.5. This, together with the concavity of v(·)i n
the region of gains, means that, from the perspective of time 4, node (5,1) is no longer as
appealing. The agent therefore leaves the casino in node (4,1).
There is an analogous and, as we will see later, more important time inconsistency in the
bottom part of the tree. For example, for almost all preference parameter values, the agent’s
preferred plan, from the perspective of time 0, is to stop gambling in node (4,5) – the node
indicated by an arrow in the bottom part of the tree in Figure 2 – should he arrive in this
node. However, if he actually arrives in node (4,5), he keeps gambling, contrary to his initial
plan. The intuition for this inconsistency parallels the intuition for the inconsistency in the
upper part of the tree.
Given the time inconsistency, the agent’s behavior depends on two things. First, it
depends on whether he is aware of the inconsistency. An agent who is aware of the in-
12consistency has an incentive to try to commit to his initial plan of action. For this agent,
then, his behavior further depends on whether he is indeed able to commit. To explore these
distinctions, we consider three types of agents. Our classiﬁcation parallels the one used in
the literature on hyperbolic discounting.
The ﬁrst type of agent is “naive”. An agent of this type is not aware of the time incon-
sistency generated by probability weighting. We analyze his behavior in Section 3.1. The
second type of agent is “sophisticated” – he is aware of the time inconsistency – but is unable
to ﬁnd a way of committing to his initial plan. We analyze his behavior in Section 3.2. The
third and ﬁnal type of agent is also sophisticated – he is also aware of the time inconsistency
– but is able to ﬁnd a way of committing to his initial plan. We analyze his behavior in
Section 3.3.10
3.1 Case I: The naive agent
We analyze the naive agent’s behavior in two steps. First, we study his time 0 decision as
to whether to enter the casino. If we ﬁnd that, for some preference parameter values, he is
willing to enter, we then look, for these parameter values, at his behavior after he enters, in
other words, at his behavior for t>0.
The initial decision
At time 0, the naive agent chooses a plan of action. A “plan” is a mapping from each
node in the binomial tree between t =0a n dt = T − 1 to one of two possible actions:
“exit,” which indicates that the agent plans to leave the casino if he arrives at that node; or
“continue,” which indicates that he plans to keep gambling if he arrives at that node. We
denote the set of all possible plans as S(0,1), where the subscript indicates that this is the set
of plans that is available in node (0,1), the left-most node in the tree. The set S(0,1) grows
rapidly in size as T increases: even for T = 5, the number of possible plans is large.11
For each plan s ∈ S(0,1), there is a random variable   Gs that represents the accumulated
winnings or losses the agent will experience if he exits the casino at the nodes speciﬁed by
10In his classic discussion of non-expected utility preferences, Machina (1989) identiﬁes three kinds of
agents: β-types, γ-types, and δ-types. In the context of our casino, the behavior of these three types of
agents would be identical to the behavior of the naive agents, the sophisticates who are able to commit, and
the sophisticates who are unable to commit, respectively.
11Since, for each of the T(T +1 ) /2 nodes between time 0 and time T − 1, the agent can either exit or
continue, the number of plans in S(0,1) is, in principle, equal to 2 to the power of T(T +1 ) /2. The number
of distinct plans is much lower, however. For example, for any T ≥ 3, all plans that assign the action “exit”
to node (0,1) are eﬀectively the same, as are all plans that assign the actions “continue,” “exit,” and “exit”
to nodes (0,1), (1,1), and (1,2), respectively.
13plan s. For example, if s is the exit strategy shown in Figure 2, then
















With this notation in hand, we can write down the problem that the naive agent solves
at time 0. It is:
max
s∈S(0,1)
V (   Gs), (9)
where V (·) computes the cumulative prospect theory value of the gamble that is its argument.
Suppose that V (   Gs) attains its maximum value for plan s∗ ∈ S(0,1). The naive agent then
enters the casino – in other words, he plays a gamble at time 0 – if and only if V ∗ ≡
V (   Gs∗) > 0.12 We emphasize that the naive agent chooses a plan at time 0 without regard
for the possibility that he might stray from the plan in future periods. After all, he is naive:
he does not realize that he might later depart from the plan.13
The nonlinear probability weighting embedded in V (·) makes it very diﬃcult to solve
problem (9) analytically; indeed, the problem has no known analytical solution for general
T. We therefore solve it numerically, focusing on the case of T = 5. We are careful to check
the robustness of our conclusions by solving (9) for a wide range of preference parameter
values.14
The time inconsistency generated by probability weighting means that we cannot use
backward induction to solve problem (9). Instead, we use the following procedure. For each
plan s ∈ S(0,1) in turn, we compute the gamble   Gs and calculate its cumulative prospect
theory value V (   Gs). We then look for the plan s∗ that maximizes V (   Gs) and check whether
V ∗ > 0.
We begin our analysis by identifying the range of preference parameter values for which
the naive agent enters the casino. We set T =5 ,h = $10, and restrict our attention
to preference parameter triples (α,δ,λ)f o rw h i c hα ∈ [0,1], δ ∈ [0.3,1], and λ ∈ [1,4].15
12Since S(0,1) includes the strategy of not entering the casino at all – this is the strategy that assigns the
action “exit” to node (0,1) – the value of V ∗ must be at least zero, the cumulative prospect theory value
of not entering. The agent enters the casino if there is a plan that involves gambling in node (0,1) whose
cumulative prospect theory value is strictly greater than zero.
13We only allow the agent to consider path-independent plans of action: his planned action at time t
depends only on his accumulated winnings at that time and not on the path by which he accumulated those
winnings.
14For one special case, the case of T = 2, a full analytical characterization of the behavior of all three
types of agents is available. We discuss this case in detail in Sections 4.3 and 7.3.
15The behavior of the three types of agents that we consider does not depend on the value of h;w es e t
h = $10 only for the sake of concreteness. We have also studied the case of T = 10 and ﬁnd that the results
in this case parallel those for T =5 .W ed on o tu s eT = 10 as our benchmark case, however, because of its
14We focus on values of λ that are less than 4 so as not to stray too far from Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) estimate of this parameter; and, as noted earlier, we restrict attention to
values of δ that exceed 0.3 so as to ensure that the weighting function (6) is monotonically
increasing. We then discretize each of the intervals [0,1], [0.3,1], and [1,4] into a set of
20 equally-spaced points and study parameter triples (α,δ,λ) where each parameter takes a
value that corresponds to one of the discrete points. In other words, we study the 203 =8 ,000
parameter triples in the set Δ, where
Δ={(α,δ,λ):α ∈{ 0,0.053,...,0.947,1},
δ ∈{ 0.3,0.337,...,0.963,1},λ∈{ 1,1.16,...,3.84,4}}. (10)
The “+” and “*” signs in Figure 3 mark the preference parameter triples for which the
naive agent enters the casino, in other words, the triples for which V ∗ > 0. We explain the
signiﬁcance of each of the two signs below – for now, the reader can ignore the distinction.
To make the marked region easier to visualize, we use a color scheme in which diﬀerent
colors correspond to diﬀerent vertical elevations. Speciﬁcally, the blue, red, green, cyan,
magenta, and yellow colors correspond to parameter triples for which λ – the parameter
on the vertical axis – takes a value in the intervals [1,1.5), [1.5,2), [2,2.5), [2.5,3), [3,3.5),
and [3.5,4], respectively.16 Finally, the small circle marks Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992)
median estimates of the preference parameters, namely
(α,δ,λ)=( 0 .88,0.65,2.25). (11)
Figure 3 illustrates our ﬁrst main result: that, even though the agent is loss averse and
even though the casino oﬀers only 50:50 bets with zero expected value, there is still a wide
range of preference parameter values for which the agent is willing to enter the casino. In
particular, he is willing to enter for 1,813 of the 8,000 parameter triples in the set Δ. Note
that, for the median estimates in (11), the agent does not enter the casino. Nonetheless, for
parameter values that are not far from those in (11), he is willing to enter.
To understand why, for many parameter values, the agent is willing to enter, we study
his optimal exit plan s∗. Consider the case of (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5), a parameter triple
for which the agent enters. The left panel in Figure 4 shows the optimal exit plan in this
case. Recall that, if a node has a white color, the agent plans to gamble at that node, should
much greater computational demands.
16In topographical terms, the region marked by the “+” and “*” signs in Figure 3 consists of two “hills”
– a steep hill in the right part of the ﬁgure and a gentler hill in the left part – with a valley in the center.
15he reach it. By contrast, if a node has a black color, he plans not to gamble at that node.
The ﬁgure shows that, roughly speaking, the agent’s optimal plan is to keep gambling until
time T or until he starts accumulating losses, whichever comes ﬁrst.
The exit plan in the left panel of Figure 4 helps us understand why it is that, even though
the agent is loss averse and even though the casino oﬀers only zero expected value bets, the
agent is still willing to enter. The reason is that, through his choice of exit plan, the agent
is able to give his perceived overall casino experience a positively skewed distribution: by
exiting once he starts accumulating losses, he limits his downside; and by continuing to
gamble when he is winning, he retains substantial upside. Since the agent overweights the
tails of probability distributions, he may like the positively skewed distribution oﬀered by
the overall casino experience. In particular, under probability weighting, the chance, albeit
small, of leaving the casino in the top-right node (T,1) with a large accumulated gain of $Th
is very enticing. In summary, then, while the agent would always turn down the basic 50:50
bet oﬀered by the casino if that bet were oﬀered in isolation, he is nonetheless able, through
a speciﬁc choice of exit strategy, to give his perceived overall casino experience a positively
skewed distribution, one which, with suﬃcient probability weighting, he ﬁnds attractive.17
The left panel in Figure 4 shows the naive agent’s optimal plan when (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5).
What does the optimal plan look like for the other preference parameter triples for which he
enters the casino? To answer this, we introduce some terminology. We label a plan a “gain-
exit” plan if, under the plan, the agent’s expected length of time in the casino conditional
on exiting with a gain is less than his expected length of time in the casino conditional on
exiting with a loss. Put simply, a gain-exit plan is one in which the agent plans to leave
quickly if he is winning but to stay longer if he is losing. Similarly, a plan is a “loss-exit”
(“neutral-exit”) plan if, under the plan, the agent’s expected length of time in the casino
conditional on exiting with a gain is greater than (the same as) his expected length of time
in the casino conditional on exiting with a loss. For example, the plan in the left panel of
Figure 4 is a loss-exit plan because, conditional on exiting with a loss, the agent spends only
one period in the casino, while conditional on exiting with a gain, he spends ﬁve periods in
the casino.
17A number of authors – see, for example, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) – have noted that prospect theory
may be able to explain why someone would turn down a single play of a positive expected value bet – a 50:50
bet to win $200 or lose $100, say – but would agree to multiple plays of the bet, a pattern of behavior that
is sometimes observed in practice. This is a diﬀerent point from the one we are making in this paper. After
all, a prospect theory agent would turn down T plays of the basic bet oﬀered by our casino for any T ≥ 1.
The reason the agent enters the casino hinges on the fact that a casino with T potential rounds of gambling
is not the same as T plays of the casino’s basic bet: in the casino, the agent has the option to leave after
each round of gambling.
16The “*” signs in Figure 3 mark the preference parameter triples for which the naive
agent enters the casino with a loss- e x i tp l a ni nm i n d . 18 In particular, for 1,021 of the 1,813
parameter triples for which the naive agent enters, he does so with a loss-exit plan in mind,
one that is either identical to that in the left panel of Figure 4 or else one that diﬀers from
it in only a very small number of nodes.
Figure 3 shows that the naive agent is more likely to enter the casino with a loss-exit
plan for low values of δ, for low values of λ, and for high values of α. The intuition is
straightforward. By adopting a loss-exit plan, the agent gives his perceived overall casino
experience a positively skewed distribution. As δ falls, the agent overweights the tails of
probability distributions more heavily. He is therefore more likely to ﬁnd the positively
skewed distribution generated by the loss-exit plan appealing. As λ falls, the agent becomes
less loss averse. He is therefore less scared by the losses he could incur under a loss-exit plan
and therefore more willing to enter with such a plan. Finally, as α increases, the marginal
utility of additional gains diminishes less rapidly. The agent is therefore more excited about
the possibility of a large win inherent in a loss-exit plan and hence more likely to enter the
casino with a plan of this kind.
For 1,021 of the 1,813 parameter triples for which the naive agent enters the casino, then,
he does so with a loss-exit plan in mind. For the remaining 792 parameter triples for which
he enters, he does so with a gain-exit plan in mind, one where he plans to gamble for longer
in the region of losses than in the region of gains. These parameter triples are indicated by
the “+” signs in Figure 3. As the ﬁgure shows, these parameter triples lie quite far from
the median estimates in (11): most of them correspond to values of α and λ that are much
lower than the median estimates or to values of δ that are much higher.
Why does the naive agent sometimes enter the casino with a gain-exit plan? Under a plan
of this kind, the agent’s perceived casino experience has a negatively skewed distribution,
one with a moderate probability of a small gain and a low probability of a large loss. If α
is very low, the large loss is only slightly more frightening than a small loss; and if δ is very
high, the low probability of the large loss is barely overweighted. As a result, when α is low
and δ is high, the agent may ﬁnd the negatively skewed distribution appealing.
Our analysis shows that the component of prospect theory most responsible for the agent
entering the casino is the probability weighting function: for the majority of the preference
parameter values for which he enters, the agent chooses a plan that corresponds to a positively
skewed casino experience; and this, in turn, is attractive precisely because of the weighting
18In case it is not clear, the “*” signs are located in the right half of the marked region in the ﬁgure. By
contrast, the left half of the marked region is made up of “+” signs.
17function. Nonetheless, the naive agent may enter the casino even in the absence of probability
weighting, in other words, even if δ = 1. For example, he enters when (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .5,1,1.2).
For this parameter triple, the agent’s optimal plan is a gain-exit plan, one that gives his
perceived casino experience a negatively skewed distribution – but since δ =1a n dα is so
low, the agent ﬁnds it appealing.
We noted earlier that, of all casino games, it is blackjack that most closely matches the
game in our model. However, our model may also explain why another casino game, the slot
machine, is as popular as it is. In our framework, an agent who enters the casino usually
does so because he relishes the positively skewed distribution he perceives it to oﬀer. Since
slot machines already oﬀer a skewed payoﬀ, they may make it easier for the agent to give his
overall casino experience a signiﬁcant amount of positive skewness. It may therefore make
sense that they would outstrip blackjack in popularity.
Figure 3 shows the range of preference parameter values for which the naive agent enters
the casino when T = 5. The range of preference parameter values for which he would enter
a casino with T>5 rounds of gambling is at least as large as the range marked in Figure
3. To see why, note that any plan that can be implemented in a casino with T = τ rounds
of gambling can also be implemented in a casino with T = τ + 1 rounds of gambling. If an
agent is willing to enter a casino with T = τ rounds of gambling, then, he will also be willing
to enter a casino with T = τ + 1 rounds of gambling: at the very least, when T = τ +1 ,h e
can just adopt the plan that leads him to enter when T = τ.
Can we say more about what happens for higher values of T? For example, Figure 3 shows
that, when T = 5, the agent does not enter the casino for Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992)
median estimates of the preference parameters. A natural question is then: are there any
values of T for which a naive agent with the median preference parameter values would be
willing to enter the casino? The following proposition, which provides a suﬃcient condition
for the naive agent to be willing to enter, allows us to answer this question. The proof of
the proposition is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: A naive agent with cumulative prospect theory preferences and the prefer-
ence parameters (α,δ,λ) is willing to enter a casino oﬀering T ≥ 2 rounds of gambling and






























is assumed to be equal to 0.
18To derive condition (12), we take one particular exit strategy which, from our numerical
analysis, we know to be either optimal or close to optimal for a wide range of preference
parameter values – roughly speaking, this is a strategy where the agent keeps gambling if he
is winning but stops gambling if he starts accumulating losses – and compute its cumulative
prospect theory value explicitly. Condition (12) checks whether this value is positive; if it is,
we know that the naive agent enters the casino. While the condition is hard to interpret, it
is useful because it allows us to learn something about the agent’s behavior when T is high
without solving problem (9), something which, for high values of T, is computationally very
taxing.20
It is easy to check that, for Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) estimates, namely (α,δ,λ)=
(0.88,0.65,2.25), the lowest value of T for which condition (12) holds is T = 26. We can
therefore state the following corollary.
Corollary: If T ≥ 26, a naive agent with cumulative prospect theory preferences and the
parameter values (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .88,0.65,2.25) is willing to enter a casino with T rounds of
gambling and a basic bet of ($h,0.5;−$h,0.5).
We noted earlier that we are dividing our analysis of the naive agent’s behavior into two
parts. We have just completed the ﬁrst part: the analysis of the agent’s time 0 decision as
to whether to enter the casino. We now turn to the second part: the analysis of what the
agent does at time t>0.
Subsequent behavior
Suppose that, at time 0, the naive agent decides to enter the casino. In node (t,j)a t
some later time t ≥ 1, he solves
max
s∈S(t,j)
V (   Gs). (13)
Here, S(t,j) is the set of plans the agent could follow from time t onward, where, in a similar
way to before, a “plan” is a mapping from each node between time t and time T − 1t o
one of two actions: “exit,” indicating that the agent plans to leave the casino if he reaches
that node, or “continue,” indicating that the agent plans to keep gambling if he reaches that
node. As before,   Gs is a random variable that represents the agent’s potential accumulated
winnings or losses if he follows plan s,a n dV (   Gs) is its cumulative prospect theory value.
20Although condition (12) is only a suﬃcient condition, there is a sense in which it is an accurate suﬃcient
condition: at least for the low values of T where it is possible to check, the set of triples (α,δ,λ)t h a ts a t i s f y
condition (12) is very similar to the set of triples for which the naive agent actually enters the casino with a
loss-exit plan. If we denote the left-hand side of condition (12) as X, it is possible to show that w(1
2) >λ Xis
also a suﬃcient condition for entry. For low T, this last condition accurately approximates the set of triples
for which the naive agent enters the casino with a gain-exit plan.
19For example, if the agent is in node (3,1), the plan under which he leaves at time T =5 ,
but not before, corresponds to










If s∗ ∈ S(t,j) is the plan that solves problem (13), the agent gambles in node (t,j)i fa n do n l y
if
V (   Gs∗) >v (h(t +2− 2j)), (14)
where the right-hand side is the utility of leaving the casino at this node.21
To see how the naive agent behaves for t ≥ 1, we ﬁrst return to the example from earlier
in this section in which T =5a n d( α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5). For these parameter values,
the naive agent enters the casino at time 0. The right panel of Figure 4 shows what he does
subsequently, at time t ≥ 1. Recall that the left panel in the ﬁgure shows the initial plan of
action he constructs at time 0.
Figure 4 shows that, while the naive agent’s initial plan was to gamble as long as possible
when winning but to stop if he started accumulating losses, he actually, roughly speaking,
does the opposite: he gambles as long as possible when losing and stops once he accumulates
some gains. Our model therefore captures a common intuition, namely that people often
gamble more than they planned to in the region of losses.
As noted earlier, the time inconsistency is entirely driven by the probability weighting
function. As of time 0, a strategy under which the agent continues to gamble if he is winning
is very attractive: under this strategy, the agent could take home $50 in node (5,1). While
this is unlikely, the low probability of it happening is overweighted, making node (5,1) very
appealing. If the agent wins the ﬁrst few bets, however, reaching node (5,1) is no longer an
unlikely outcome, and, as such, is no longer overweighted. This, together with the concavity
of the value function in the region of gains, means that the agent stops gambling after earning
some gains, contrary to his initial plan.
A similar mechanism is at work in the lower part of the tree. As of time 0, a plan under
which the agent continues to gamble if he is losing is very unattractive: such a plan exposes
the agent to low probability losses, which, given that the agent overweights tail probabilities,
is very unappealing. If the agent starts losing, however, losses that were initially unlikely
21Since S(t,j) includes the strategy of leaving the casino in node (t,j) – this is the strategy that assigns
the action “exit” to node (t,j) – the value of V (  Gs∗)m u s tb ea tl e a s tv(h(t +2− 2j)). The agent gambles
in node (t,j) if there is a plan that involves gambling in node (t,j) whose cumulative prospect theory value
is strictly greater than v(h(t +2− 2j)).
20and hence overweighted are no longer unlikely and therefore no longer overweighted. This,
together, with the convexity of the value function in the region of losses, means that the
agent continues to gamble if he is losing, contrary to his initial plan.22
How typical is the behavior in the right panel of Figure 4? Earlier in this section, we
described a numerical analysis of 8,000 preference parameter triples and noted that the naive
agent enters the casino for 1,813 of these 8,000 triples. We ﬁnd that, for all 1,813 of these
triples, the agent’s actual behavior in the casino is described by a gain-exit strategy that is
either exactly equal to the one in the right panel of Figure 4 or else one that diﬀers from it
in only a very small number of nodes; indeed, for triples for which α>0, the agent always
gambles until T = 5 in the region of losses. We noted earlier that, for 1,021 of the 1,813
triples for which the naive agent enters the casino, his initial plan is a loss-exit plan. In
all 1,021 of these cases, then, the naive agent’s actual behavior is, roughly speaking, the
opposite of what he initially planned.23
3.2 Case II: The sophisticated agent, without commitment
In section 3.1, we considered the case of a naive agent – an agent who is unaware of the
time inconsistency generated by probability weighting. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we study
sophisticated agents, in other words, agents who are aware of the time inconsistency. A
sophisticated agent has an incentive to try to commit to his time 0 plan. In this section, we
consider the case of a sophisticated agent who is unable to ﬁnd a way of committing to his
time 0 plan; we label this agent a “no-commitment sophisticate”. In Section 3.3, we study
the case of a sophisticated agent who is able to commit to his initial plan.
To decide on a course of action, the no-commitment sophisticate uses backward induction,
working leftward from the right-most column of the binomial tree. If he has not yet left the
casino at time T, he must exit at that time. Knowing this, he is able to determine what he
will do at time T −1. This, in turn, allows him to determine what he will do at time T −2,
and so on.
22The naive agent’s “naivete” can be interpreted in two ways. The agent may fail to realize that, after he
starts gambling, he will be tempted to depart from his initial plan. Alternatively, he may recognize that he
will be tempted to depart from his initial plan, but he may erroneously think that he will be able to resist
the temptation. After many casino visits, the agent may learn his way out of the ﬁrst kind of naivete. It may
take him much longer, however, to learn his way out of the second kind. People often continue to believe
that they will be able to exert self-control in the future even when they have repeatedly failed to do so in
the past.
23For the remaining 792 triples for which the naive agent enters the casino, his actual behavior is more
similar to his initial plan: both his initial plan and actual behavior are gain-exit strategies in which he
gambles longer in the region of losses than in the region of gains.
21Mathematically, the no-commitment sophisticate gambles in node (t,j), where t ∈ [0,T−
1], if and only if
V (   Gt,j) >v (h(t +2− 2j)). (15)
The term v(h(t+2−2j)) is the utility of leaving the casino in node (t,j). The term V (   Gt,j)
is the value of continuing to gamble: speciﬁcally, it is the cumulative prospect theory value
of the random variable   Gt,j which represents the accumulated winnings or losses the agent
will exit the casino with if he gambles in node (t,j). The random variable   Gt,j is determined
by the exit strategy computed in earlier steps of the backward iteration. Note that, precisely
because he computes his course of action using backward induction, the no-commitment
sophisticate is time consistent.
We study the behavior of the no-commitment sophisticate for T = 5 and for each of the
8,000 preference parameter triples in the set Δ deﬁned in (10). The “+” signs in Figure 5
mark the triples for which the no-commitment sophisticate enters the casino – in other words,
the triples for which V (   G0,1) > 0. As before, we use a color scheme to make the marked region
easier to visualize. The blue, red, green, and cyan colors correspond to parameter triples for
which λ lies in the intervals [1,1.5), [1.5,2), [2,2.5), and [2.5,4], respectively.
The ﬁgure shows that the agent enters the casino for only a narrow range of parameter
triples: speciﬁcally, for just 753 parameter triples, all of which lie far from the small circle
which marks Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) estimates in (11). The intuition is straight-
forward. The agent realizes that, if he does enter the casino, he will gamble longer in the
region of losses than in the region of gains. This will give his overall casino experience a
negatively skewed distribution. Since he overweights the tails of distributions, he usually
ﬁnds this unattractive and therefore refuses to enter. Reasoning of this type may in part
explain why the majority of Americans do not gamble in casinos.
For the 753 parameter triples for which the no-commitment sophisticate enters the casino,
he follows a gain-exit strategy. When α and λ are suﬃciently low and δ is suﬃciently high,
the negatively skewed casino experience generated by this strategy is actually appealing.
3.3 Case III: The sophisticated agent, with commitment
In this section, we study the behavior of a sophisticated agent who is able to commit to his
initial plan. We call this agent a “commitment-aided sophisticate.”
We proceed in the following way. We assume that, at time 0, the agent can ﬁnd a way
of committing to any exit strategy s ∈ S(0,1). Once we identify the strategy that he would
22choose, we then discuss how he might actually commit to this strategy in practice.
At time 0, then, the commitment-aided sophisticate solves:
max
s∈S(0,1)
V (   Gs). (16)
In particular, since he can commit to any exit strategy, we do not need to restrict the set of
strategies he considers. He searches across all elements of S(0,1) until he ﬁnds the strategy
s∗ with the highest cumulative prospect theory value V ∗ = V (   Gs∗). He enters the casino if
and only if V ∗ > 0.
The problem in (16) is identical to the problem solved by the naive agent at time 0.
The two types of agents therefore enter the casino for exactly the same range of preference
parameter values. For T = 5, for example, the commitment-aided sophisticate enters the
casino for the 1,813 parameter triples marked by the “+” and “*” signs in Figure 3. Moreover,
for any given parameter triple, the commitment-aided sophisticate and the naive agent enter
the casino with exactly the same strategy in mind. For example, for the 1,021 parameter
triples indicated by “*” signs in Figure 3, the commitment-aided sophisticate enters the
casino with a loss-exit plan in mind, as does the naive agent.
The naive agent and the commitment-aided sophisticate solve the same problem at time
0 because they both think that they will be able to maintain any plan they select at that
time. The two types of agents diﬀer, however, in what they do after they enter the casino.
Since he has a commitment device at his disposal, the commitment-aided sophisticate is able
to stick to his initial plan. The naive agent, on the other hand, deviates from his initial plan.
For the 1,021 parameter triples indicated by “*” signs in Figure 3, then, the commitment-
aided sophisticate would like to commit to a loss-exit strategy. The question now is: how
does he commit to such a strategy? For example, in the lower part of the binomial tree, how
does he manage to stop gambling when he is losing even though he is tempted to continue?
And in the upper part of the tree, how does he manage to continue gambling when he is
winning even though he is tempted to stop?24
In the lower part of the tree, one simple commitment strategy is for the agent to go to
the casino with only a small amount of cash and to leave his ATM card at home. If he starts
accumulating losses, he is sorely tempted to continue gambling, but, since he has run out of
cash, he has no option but to go home. It is a prediction of our model that some gamblers
24We are focusing on the parameter triples marked by “*” signs in Figure 3 because they are closer to
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) median parameter estimates than are the triples marked by “+” signs.
Note also that, for the latter set of triples, the commitment problem is less severe because the agent’s initial
preferences are more aligned with his subsequent preferences: both preferences favor gain-exit strategies.
23will use a strategy of this kind. Anecdotal reports suggest that this is a common gambling
strategy.
It is harder to think of a common strategy that gamblers use to solve the commitment
problem in the upper part of the tree. In a way, this is not surprising. An interesting
prediction of our model – a prediction that we have found to hold all the more strongly for
higher values of T – is that the time inconsistency is more severe in the lower part of the
tree than in the upper part. Comparing the two panels in Figure 4, we see that, in the lower
part of the tree, the time inconsistency, and hence the commitment problem, is severe: the
agent wants to gamble in every node in the region of losses even though his initial plan was
to gamble in none of them. In the upper part of the tree, however, the time inconsistency,
and hence the commitment problem, is less acute: the agent’s initial plan conﬂicts with his
subsequent preferences in only a few nodes. It therefore makes sense that the commitment
strategies gamblers use in practice seem to be aimed primarily at the time inconsistency in
the lower part of the tree.
Although it is hard to think of ways in which gamblers commit to their initial plan in the
upper part of the tree, note that here, casinos have an incentive to help. In general, casinos
oﬀer bets with negative expected values; it is therefore in their interest that gamblers stay
on site as long as possible. From the casinos’ perspective, it is alarming that gamblers are
tempted to leave earlier than planned when they are winning. This may explain the practice
among some casinos of oﬀering vouchers for free food and lodging to people who are winning.
In our framework, casinos do this in order to encourage gamblers who are thinking of leaving
with their gains, to stay longer.25
4F u r t h e r R e m a r k s
4.1 Average losses
Our analysis shows that the set of casino gamblers consists primarily of two distinct types:
naive agents and commitment-aided sophisticates. Which of these two types loses more
25When the commitment-aided sophisticate chooses a plan to commit to at time 0, he does not put any
weight on the preferences of his future “selves.” For example, when (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5), he commits to
the plan in the left panel of Figure 4 even though he knows that, in node (1,2), his time 1 self will want to
continue gambling. One interpretation of this is that the time 0 self disapproves of his future preferences.
This, in turn, can be justiﬁed by arguing that, in wanting to deviate from the time 0 plan, the time 1 self
is committing an error of “consequentialism”: of ignoring risk that was previously borne but not realized
(Machina, 1989). Nonetheless, it may be interesting to study a model in which the time 0 self puts at least
some weight on future selves’ preferences when choosing a plan to commit to.
24money in the casino, on average?
In the context of the model of Section 3, the answer is straightforward. Since the basic
bet oﬀered by the casino has an expected value of zero, average winnings are zero for both
types. However, if, as in actual casinos, the basic bet has a negative expected value, then
an agent’s average winnings are the (negative) expected value of the basic bet multiplied
by the average number of rounds the agent gambles. To determine whether the naive agent
loses more, on average, than the commitment-aided sophisticate, we therefore need to check
whether he gambles for longer, on average.
We have studied the gambling behavior of the two types of agents when the basic bet
oﬀered by the casino has a negative expected value – for example, when it takes the form
($h,0.46;−$h,0.54). We ﬁnd that, for most preference parameter values – although not all
– the naive agent stays in the casino longer, on average, than does the sophisticated agent.
In most cases, then, his average losses are larger.
4.2 Competition from lotteries
A natural question raised by our analysis is: how can casinos survive competition from
lottery providers? After all, the one-shot gambles oﬀered by lottery providers may be a
more convenient source of the positive skewness that the casino goers in our framework are
seeking.
In this section, we discuss one mechanism through which casinos can survive competition
from lotteries – a mechanism that we can analyze using the framework of Section 3. We
demonstrate the idea formally with the help of a simple equilibrium model, presented in
detail in Section 7.2 in the Appendix.
In this model, there is competitive provision of both one-shot lotteries and casinos and
both types of ﬁrms incur a cost per consumer served. Even so, both lottery providers and
casinos manage to break even. In equilibrium, lottery providers attract the no-commitment
sophisticates. These agents prefer lotteries to casinos because they know that, in a casino,
they would face a negatively skewed, and hence unattractive, distribution of accumulated
gains and losses.
Casinos compete with lottery providers by oﬀering slightly better, albeit unfair, odds.
This attracts the commitment-aided sophisticates and the naive agents, both of whom think
that, through a particular choice of exit strategy, they can construct an overall casino experi-
ence – in other words, a distribution of accumulated gains and losses – whose prospect theory
value exceeds the prospect theory value oﬀered by one-shot lotteries. The commitment-aided
25sophisticates are indeed able to construct such a casino experience. Since casinos incur a
cost per consumer served, they lose money on these agents. They make these losses up,
however, on the naive agents, because, as noted in Section 4.1, these agents gamble longer,
on average, than they were planning to. In short, then, casinos are able to compete with
lottery providers because their dynamic structure allows them to exploit naive agents’ time
inconsistency.
The equilibrium model in the Appendix also sheds light on a related question, namely
whether casinos would want to explicitly oﬀer, in the form of a one-shot gamble, the overall
casino experience that their customers are trying to construct dynamically. According to the
model, casinos would not want to oﬀer such a one-shot gamble. If they did, naive agents,
believing themselves to be indiﬀerent between the one-shot and dynamic gambles, might
switch to the one-shot gamble, thereby eﬀectively converting themselves from naive agents
to commitment-aided sophisticates. Casinos would then lose money, however, because it is
precisely naive agents’ time inconsistency that allows them to break even.
4.3 The case of T =2
The decision problems of the naive agent, the no-commitment sophisticate, and the commitment-
aided sophisticate – problems (9), (15), and (16) – have no known analytical solution for
general T. We have therefore solved them numerically for a wide range of preference param-
eter values. When T = 2, however, these problems do have analytical solutions. We present
these solutions in Proposition 2 in Section 7.3 of the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the case of T = 2 is quite rich: several of the patterns that
emerged in Section 3 from our analysis of the T = 5 case turn out to hold even when T =2 .
For example, in Section 3 we saw that, when T = 5, the naive agent either does not enter the
casino at all, or else enters with a loss-exit strategy in mind but actually follows a gain-exit
strategy, or else enters with a gain-exit strategy in mind and then indeed follows a gain-
exit strategy. We also saw that the no-commitment sophisticate enters the casino for only
a limited range of preference parameter values, a range that is far removed from Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1992) median estimates; and that when he enters, he follows a gain-exit
strategy. Proposition 2 shows that these results hold even when T =2 .
The proposition also shows that, in other ways, the case of T =2i sless rich than the
case of T>2. In Section 4.1, we saw that, when T = 5, the naive agent typically stays in the
casino longer, on average, than he originally planned to, a result that played a crucial role
in our discussion of how casinos compete with lotteries. Proposition 2 shows, however, that
26when T = 2, the naive agent stays in the casino exactly as long, on average, as he planned
to.
A more serious limitation of the T =2c a s ei st h a t ,w h e nT = 2, the naive agent enters
the casino for only a very narrow range of preference parameter values. The reason is that,
when T = 2, it is diﬃcult for the agent to create a casino experience that is positively skewed
enough to overcome the aversion to gambling that stems from loss aversion. As a result, we
cannot use the T = 2 case to build a strong case for prospect theory as a driver of casino
gambling. It is only when we study the case of T>2, as we do in Section 3, that we ﬁnd
that the naive agent is willing to enter the casino for a wide range of preference parameter
values, a range that, for suﬃciently high T, includes even Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992)
median estimates. This allows us to build a stronger case for prospect theory as a driver of
casino gambling.
4.4 The inﬁnite horizon case
In our analysis so far, we have imposed an exogeneous date, date T, at which the agent
must leave the casino if he has not already done so. We make this assumption because we
think that it captures an important feature of gambling: most people simply cannot stay in
a casino indeﬁnitely. It is nonetheless interesting to ask whether the conclusions of Section
3 also hold in an inﬁnite horizon setting. We therefore brieﬂy discuss this case. In short, we
ﬁnd that the predictions of the inﬁnite horizon analysis are broadly consistent with those of
the ﬁnite horizon analysis.
Suppose that a cumulative prospect theory agent is evaluating a casino of the kind de-
scribed in Section 3, except that there is now no ﬁnal date T. Without further constraints,
the problem is not well-posed: the agent can achieve arbitrarily high utility by planning to
exit the casino only when his accumulated gains reach $ah,w h e r ea is a suﬃciently large
positive integer. A natural constraint to add is a limited liability constraint, one that re-
quires the agent to leave the casino if his accumulated losses reach $bh,w h e r eb is a positive
integer. Even with this constraint, however, the problem is still not well-posed for a range of
empirically relevant preference parameter values. The problem becomes well-posed, however,
if we change the basic bet oﬀered by the casino from a 50:50 bet to win or lose $h to
($h,p;−$h,1 − p), (17)
27where p<0.5.26
We therefore study an inﬁnite horizon casino that oﬀers the basic bet in (17), with the




V (   Gs). (18)
This parallels the decision problem in (9), but with some diﬀerences. S0 is the set of strategies
available to the agent when, as at time 0, his accumulated gains equal 0. We consider
strategies in which the agent leaves the casino if his accumulated gains reach $ah,w h e r ea
is any positive integer, or if his accumulated losses reach $bh,w h e r eb is any non-negative
integer with b ≤ b. As before,   Gs is a random variable that represents the accumulated
gains or losses the agent will experience if he follows strategy s ∈ S0, while V (·) computes
the cumulative prospect theory value of its argument. Using standard results – see Feller
(1968) – we know that













,p b =1− pa. (20)
The agent enters the casino if V (   Gs∗) > 0, where s∗ is the plan that solves problem (18).
We solve problem (18) for h = $10, b = 100, p =0 .45, and for the same benchmark
preference parameter values as before, namely (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5). We ﬁnd that the
naive agent enters the casino, and that the optimal gambling plan sets a =7a n db =1 .I n
other words, the agent plans to gamble until he wins $70 or loses $10. This optimal plan has
a very similar ﬂavor to the naive agent’s optimal plan in the ﬁnite horizon case, in that it
generates a perceived casino experience that is positively skewed. Indeed, as before, it is this
positive skewness that the agent ﬁnds attractive and that leads him to enter the casino.27
26A decision problem is not well-posed – in other words, it is ill-posed – if the supremum of the utilities
that the agent can obtain from all feasible strategies is inﬁnite. Suppose that an agent enters an inﬁnite
horizon casino oﬀering 50:50 bets to win or lose $h with the plan to leave only when his accumulated gains
reach $ah for some positive integer a. We know from standard theory that he will reach this goal with
probability 1. The cumulative prospect theory value of this plan is therefore v(ah), which can be arbitrarily
large. With a little more algebra, we can show that, even in the presence of a limited liability constraint,
the decision problem is ill-posed when α>δ , an empirically important case.
27We ﬁnd that, for p =0 .45, the naive agent enters the casino for 1,007 of the 8,000 parameter triples
in the set Δ in (10). For 309 of these 1,007 triples, he enters the casino with a loss-exit plan in mind,
while for the remaining 698 triples, he enters with a gain-exit plan, where, in the context of the inﬁnite
horizon model, we deﬁne a gain-exit (loss-exit) plan as one in which the agent is more likely to leave the
casino with an accumulated gain (loss) than with an accumulated loss (gain). While gain-exit plans are
28What does the naive agent do subsequently? Suppose that, at some later date, his
accumulated gains equal $kh, for some integer k. At this point, he continues to gamble if
max
s∈Sk
V (   Gs) >v (kh). (21)
This condition parallels condition (14). Here, Sk is the set of strategies available to the agent
when his accumulated gains equal $kh. We consider strategies for which the agent continues
to gamble until his accumulated gains reach $ah,w h e r ea is an integer that satisﬁes a ≥ k,o r
until his accumulated losses reach $bh,w h e r eb is an integer that satisﬁes −(k −1) ≤ b ≤ b.
We ﬁnd that, just as in the ﬁnite horizon case, and for similar reasons, the naive agent
is time inconsistent. For example, we saw that, when (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5), the agent’s
initial plan was to leave the casino if he accumulated $10 in losses. However, if he actually
loses $10, he instead continues to gamble, contrary to his initial plan. Indeed, we ﬁnd that,
in the region of losses, the naive agent only leaves the casino if forced to, in other words,
only if his accumulated losses reach $bh. Just as in the ﬁnite horizon case, then, the naive
agent gambles much longer than planned in the region of losses.
4.5 Predictions and other evidence
Our model makes a number of novel predictions – predictions that, we hope, will eventually
be tested. Perhaps the clearest prediction is that gamblers’ planned behavior will diﬀer from
their actual behavior in systematic ways. Speciﬁcally, if we survey people when they ﬁrst
enter a casino as to what they plan to do and then look at what they actually do, we should
ﬁnd that, on average, they exit sooner than planned in the region of gains and later than
planned in the region of losses. Moreover, if gamblers who are more sophisticated in the real-
world sense of the word – in terms of education or income, say – are also more sophisticated
in terms of recognizing their potential time inconsistency, we should see a larger diﬀerence
between planned and actual behavior among the less sophisticated.
Some experimental evidence already available in the literature gives us hope that these
predictions will be conﬁrmed in the ﬁeld. Barkan and Busemeyer (1999) and Andrade and
Iyer (2009) oﬀer subjects a sequence of 50:50 bets in a laboratory setting; but before playing
the gambles, subjects are asked how they plan to gamble in each round. Both studies ﬁnd
that, consistent with our model, subjects systematically gamble more than planned after an
more common overall, loss-exit plans are more common for preference parameter values that are closer to
the median estimates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
29early loss; and in Barkan and Busemeyer’s study, they also gamble less than planned after
an early gain.28
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we present a new model of casino gambling, one that is rooted in the probability
weighting component of cumulative prospect theory. In recent years, probability weighting
has been linked to a wide range of economic phenomena. For example, Barberis and Huang
(2008) suggest that it is responsible for several empirical patterns in ﬁnancial markets, in-
cluding the low long-term average return on IPO stocks and the apparent overpricing of
out-of-the-money options. Taken together with this prior research, then, our paper suggests
that casino gambling is not an isolated phenomenon requiring its own unique explanation,
but rather that it is one of a family of empirical facts, all of which are driven by the same
underlying mechanism: probability weighting.
28If we reinterpret the binomial tree in Section 3 as representing not a casino, but rather the evolution
of a stock price over time, then the results in that section also suggest predictions about how a cumulative
prospect theory investor would trade a stock over time. We have studied this question in a framework similar
to that of Section 3 and ﬁnd that the model indeed delivers a range of novel predictions. For example, a
naive investor, who is unaware of the time inconsistency generated by probability weighting, may exhibit a
“disposition eﬀect” in his trading – see Odean (1998) – even though he planned to exhibit the opposite of
the disposition eﬀect. This particular contrast between planned and actual behavior has not been noted in
the prior work on the trading of prospect theory investors because this literature has ignored the dynamic
eﬀects of probability weighting.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Through extensive numerical analysis, we ﬁnd that, when the naive agent enters the casino,
he often chooses the following strategy or one similar to it: he exits (i) if he loses in the ﬁrst
round; (ii) if, after the ﬁrst round, his accumulated winnings ever drop to zero; and (iii) at
time T, if he has not already left by that point. Condition (12) simply checks whether the
cumulative prospect theory value of this speciﬁc exit strategy is positive. If it is, we know
that the agent enters the casino.
31If the agent exits because he loses in the ﬁrst round, then, since the payoﬀ of −$h is
the only negative payoﬀ he can receive under the above exit strategy, its contribution to the
cumulative prospect theory value of the strategy is −λhαw(0.5). If he exits because, at some
point after the ﬁrst round, his accumulated winnings drop to zero, this contributes nothing
to the cumulative prospect theory value of the exit strategy, precisely because the payoﬀ is
zero. All that remains, then, is to compute the component of the cumulative prospect theory
value of the exit strategy that stems from the agent exiting at date T.
Under the above exit strategy, there are T − [T
2]d a t eT nodes with positive payoﬀs at
which the agent might exit, namely nodes (T,j), where j =1 ,...,T − [
T
2]. The payoﬀ in
node (T,j)i s( T +2− 2j)h. We need to compute the probability that the agent exits in
node (T,j), in other words, the probability that he moves from the initial node (0,1) to node
(T,j) without losing in the ﬁrst round and without his accumulated winnings dropping to
zero at any point after that. With the help of the reﬂection principle – see Feller (1968) –



























In summary then, the exit strategy we described above has positive cumulative prospect
























This is condition (12).
By appropriately modifying the above argument, it is straightforward to check that, if
the basic bet oﬀered by the casino is ($h,p;−$h,1 − p)f o rs o m ep ∈ (0,1) rather than































7.2 A model with competitive provision of both lotteries and casi-
nos
In this section, we show that casinos can survive in an economy with competitive provision
of both lotteries and casinos. Consider an economy with two kinds of ﬁrms: “casinos” and
“lottery providers.” There are many ﬁrms of each kind; we index casinos with the subscript
i and lottery providers with the subscript j.
Each casino has the form described in Section 3, with one exception. As before, each
casino oﬀers T rounds of gambling, but the basic bet in casino i is now ($h,pi;−$h,1 − pi),
where pi is no longer necessarily equal to 0.5 but can instead take any value in the interval
(0,0.5]. The parameters T and $h are ﬁxed across casinos, but each casino chooses its own
value of pi.
Lottery provider j oﬀers consumers a one-shot gamble   Lj of its own choosing. To keep
the model tractable, we require that   Lj satisﬁes the following condition: it must be possible
to dynamically construct   Lj, using some exit strategy, in a hypothetical casino that oﬀers T
rounds of gambling and a basic bet of the form ($h,qj;−$h,1 − qj)f o rs o m eqj ∈ (0,0.5].29
There is a continuum of consumers with a total mass of one. All consumers have the
cumulative prospect theory preferences in (3)-(6) with identical preference parameters α,
δ,a n dλ. Each consumer must either play in one of the casinos, take one of the one-shot
gambles oﬀered by lottery providers, or do nothing. He chooses the option with the highest
cumulative prospect theory value. A fraction μN ≥ 0 of consumers are naive about the
time inconsistency they would experience in a casino; a fraction μS,NC ≥ 0 are sophisticated
about the time inconsistency but do not have access to a commitment device; and a fraction
μS,CA =1−μN −μS,NC ≥ 0 are also sophisticated about the time inconsistency and do have
access to a commitment device. Each casino and each lottery provider incurs a cost C>0
per unit of consumers it serves. It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case where
29The intuition of this section does not depend on the speciﬁc structure we impose on the gambles oﬀered
by lottery providers; we impose this assumption only to simplify the model. It is important, however, that
there be a bound on the maximum loss that a lottery provider or a casino can impose on a consumer;
otherwise, both lottery providers and casinos could oﬀer consumers gambles with negative expected values
but inﬁnite cumulative prospect theory values. This is a consequence of the fact that the prospect theory
value function is convex even for large losses. In a more general model that imposes risk aversion for large
losses, there would be no need for an exogeneous bound on the size of a loss: consumers would simply turn
down gambles with large potential losses.
33casinos and lottery providers have diﬀerent cost structures.
In this economy, a competitive equilibrium consists of a set {pi},w h e r epi is the win
probability of the basic bet in casino i,a n das e t{  Lj},w h e r e  Lj is the one-shot gamble
oﬀered by lottery provider j, such that, after consumers choose between casinos, lotteries,
and doing nothing, all casinos and all lottery providers earn zero average proﬁts; and such
that there are no proﬁtable deviations from equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, there is no basic bet
win probability p
 
i  = pi (  L
 
j  =   Lj)t h a tc a s i n oi (lottery provider j) can oﬀer and earn positive
average proﬁts.
We now show that there is a competitive equilibrium in which all lottery providers oﬀer
the same lottery   L and all casinos oﬀer the same win probability p and in which lottery
providers attract the no-commitment sophisticates while casinos attract the naive agents
and the commitment-aided sophisticates. To construct such an equilibrium, it is suﬃcient
to ﬁnd a lottery   L that solves
max V (  L) (22)
–i nw o r d s ,   L has the highest possible cumulative prospect theory value V (  L)a m o n ga l l
one-shot lotteries that can be dynamically constructed, using some exit strategy, from a
hypothetical casino with T rounds of gambling and a basic bet of ($h,q;−$h,1−q)f o rs o m e
q ∈ (0,0.5] – subject to the zero proﬁt condition for lottery providers,
−μS,NCE(  L)=μS,NCC, (23)
the participation constraint V (  L) ≥ 0, and the incentive compatibility constraint, namely
that the no-commitment sophisticates prefer   L to a casino with a basic bet win probability
of p;a n dap ∈ (0,0.5] that solves
max
s∈S(0,1)
V (   Gs) (24)
– in words, it is the value of p that, in a casino with a basic bet win probability of p, allows
agents to dynamically construct a gamble with the highest possible cumulative prospect
theory value – subject to the zero proﬁt condition for casinos,
−μNE(   GN) − μS,CAE(   GS,CA)=( μN + μS,CA)C, (25)
where   GN and   GS,CA are random variables that measure the accumulated gains and losses
under the naive agent’s exit strategy and the commitment-aided sophisticate’s exit strategy,
respectively, and subject to the participation constraints and incentive compatibility con-
34straints for both naive agents and commitment-aided sophisticates. If we can ﬁnd such   L
and p, then there is an equilibrium in which all lottery providers oﬀer   L and all casinos oﬀer
a basic bet win probability of p. In particular, by construction of   L and p,t h e r ea r en o
proﬁtable deviations for either casinos or lottery providers.30
We now construct an equilibrium explicitly. We ﬁnd that the intuition underlying our
equilibrium is robust, in that we are able to construct an equilibrium of the form described
above for a wide range of model parameters.
Suppose that, as in Section 3, (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5), T =5 ,a n dh = $10; and also






3)a n dC = 2. Then there is an equilibrium in which each
lottery provider oﬀers consumers the one-shot positively skewed gamble
($50,0.018;$30,0.068;$10,0.056;$0,0.309;−$10,0.550). (26)
This lottery solves problem (22) subject to the associated conditions. Its expected value is
-2, its cumulative prospect theory value is 1.78, and it can be dynamically constructed from
a hypothetical casino oﬀering a basic bet of ($10,0.45;−$10,0.55), so that qj =0 .45 for
all lottery providers. Meanwhile, each casino oﬀers the basic bet ($10,0.465;−$10,0.535);
in particular, p =0 .465 solves problem (24) subject to the associated conditions. The
distribution of accumulated gains and losses with the highest cumulative prospect theory
value that can be constructed out of this casino is
($50,0.022;$30,0.075;$10,0.058;$0,0.311;−$10,0.535). (27)
This gamble has an expected value of -1.43 and a cumulative prospect theory value of 2.15.31
Note that, in this equilibrium, the no-commitment sophisticates do indeed prefer the
one-shot gamble (26) oﬀered by the lottery providers to any casino. The lottery has positive
cumulative prospect theory value. If these agents played in a casino, their time inconsistency
would generate a negatively skewed, and hence unattractive, distribution of accumulated
gains and losses. The expected value of the lottery in (26) is exactly equal to the cost, C,
thereby allowing lottery providers to break even.
The commitment-aided sophisticates, however, prefer casinos because they oﬀer better
30Note that E(   GN) is the expected value of the accumulated gains and losses under the naive agent’s
actual exit strategy, not his planned exit strategy. Because of the agent’s naivete, the two strategies are, of
course, diﬀerent.
31We only report a few signiﬁcant ﬁgures so as not to clutter the exposition. More precisely, in equilibrium,
qj =0 .4499 for all j,a n dp =0 .4652.
35odds: the basic bet in a casino has a win probability of p =0 .465, while the lottery in
(26) corresponds to a basic bet win probability of q =0 .45. Put diﬀerently, in a casino,
the commitment-aided sophisticates can construct the accumulated gains and losses in (27)
whose prospect theory value of 2.15 is higher than the 1.78 prospect theory value of the
lottery in (26).
The naive agents also prefer casinos because they think that, in a casino, they can
dynamically construct the gamble in (27), a gamble with higher prospect theory value than
the lottery in (26). However, because of their time inconsistency, their actual exit strategy
is quite diﬀerent from their planned exit strategy. In particular, they gamble for longer in
the casino, on average, than they were expecting to. As a result, the expected value of
their accumulated gains and losses under their actual exit strategy, namely -2.57, is much
lower than the expected value of their accumulated gains and losses under their planned exit











the zero proﬁt condition (25) for casinos is satisﬁed. Intuitively, casinos lose money on the
commitment-aided sophisticates but make these losses up on the naive agents who gamble
longer at casinos, on average, than they were planning to.
In summary, then, we have shown that casinos can survive in an economy with com-
petitive provision of both lotteries and casinos. In equilibrium, lottery providers attract
the no-commitment sophisticates. Casinos oﬀer slightly better odds, and attract the naive
agents and the commitment-aided sophisticates. They lose money on the commitment-aided
sophisticates but make these losses up on the naive agents.
7.3 Analytical results for T =2
Proposition 2 below presents analytical solutions to the decision problems faced by the three














is greater than λ, is between 1/λ and λ in value, or is less than 1/λ.
Proposition 2: Suppose that a casino oﬀers T = 2 rounds of gambling and a basic bet of
($h, 1
2;−$h, 1
2). Consider an agent who maximizes the cumulative prospect theory value of his
36accumulated winnings at the moment he leaves the casino and whose preference parameters
satisfy α,δ ∈ (0,1) and λ>1. Then the agent’s behavior depends on whether he is naive, a
no-commitment sophisticate, or a commitment-aided sophisticate, in the following way:
Naive agent:
If K>λ , he enters the casino with a plan to stop after a ﬁrst-round loss and to continue
gambling after a ﬁrst-round win. However, he is time inconsistent: after a ﬁrst-round loss,
he continues gambling and after a ﬁrst-round win, he stops.
If 1/λ ≤ K ≤ λ, he does not enter the casino.
If K<1/λ, he enters the casino with a plan to stop after a ﬁrst-round win and to continue
gambling after a ﬁrst-round loss. Moreover, he is time consistent and follows through on this
plan.
No-commitment sophisticate:
If K ≥ 1/λ, he does not enter the casino.
If K<1/λ, he enters the casino with a plan to stop after a ﬁrst-round win and to
continue gambling after a ﬁrst-round loss. He indeed follows through on this plan.
Commitment-aided sophisticate:
If K>λ , he enters the casino with a plan to stop after a ﬁrst-round loss and to continue
gambling after a ﬁrst-round win. With the help of a commitment device, he follows through
on this plan.
If 1/λ ≤ K ≤ λ, he does not enter the casino.
If K<1/λ, he enters the casino with a plan to stop after a ﬁrst-round win and to
continue gambling after a ﬁrst-round loss. Even in the absence of a commitment device, he
is able to follow through on this plan.
Proof:
We ﬁrst analyze the behavior of the naive agent. At time 0, this agent can choose one
of the following ﬁve plans: (a) do not enter the casino at all; (b) enter the casino and exit
at time T = 1; (c) enter the casino and exit at time T = 2; (d) enter the casino and exit
at time T = 2 or in node (1,1), whichever comes ﬁrst; (e) enter the casino and exit at time
T = 2 or in node (1,2), whichever comes ﬁrst.
Note that plans (b) and (c) can never be optimal because they are both dominated by

















Since λ>1, this condition also always holds.
To determine the naive agent’s optimal plan at time 0, then, we need only compare plans






























which is equivalent to the condition K>1. Since λ>1, this means that, if K>λ ,t h e
naive agent selects plan (e); that, if 1/λ ≤ K ≤ λ,h es e l e c t sp l a n( a ) ;a n dt h a t ,i fK<1/λ,
he selects plan (d).
Now suppose that the naive agent enters the casino. What does he actually do thereafter?











for all α,δ ∈ (0,1).
In summary, then, when K>λ , the naive agent enters the casino with plan (e) in
mind. However, he is time inconsistent: after he enters, he actually follows plan (d). When
K<1/λ, he enters the casino with plan (d) in mind. Moreover, he is time consistent: after
he enters, he indeed follows plan (d). When 1/λ ≤ K ≤ λ, he does not enter the casino at
all.
Given these results, we can immediately summarize the behavior of the commitment-
38aided sophisticate. If K>λ , this agent enters the casino with plan (e) in mind and, with
the help of a commitment device, is able to follow through on this plan. If K<1/λ,h e
enters the casino with plan (d) in mind and, even in the absence of a commitment device,
follows through on this plan. If 1/λ ≤ K ≤ λ, he does not enter the casino at all.
To complete the proof, we consider the case of the no-commitment sophisticate. Given
that conditions (29) and (30) hold for all α,δ ∈ (0,1), this agent knows that he will stop
gambling if he arrives in node (1,1) and that he will continue to gamble if he arrives in node
(1,2). He therefore knows that, if he enters the casino, the distribution of his accumulated



















which is equivalent to the condition K<1/λ.F o r K<1/λ, then, the no-commitment
sophisticate enters the casino with plan (d) in mind and then follows through on this plan.
For K ≥ 1/λ, he does not enter the casino.























Figure 1. The left panel plots the value function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) as part of their cumulative prospect theory, namely v(x)=xα for x ≥ 0 and
v(x)=−λ(−x)α forx<0,forα =0 .5andλ =2 .5.Therightpanelplotstheprobability
weighting function they propose, namely w(P)=P δ/(P δ +( 1− P)δ)1/δ, for three
different values of δ. The dashed line corresponds to δ =0 .4, the solid line to δ =0 .65,
and the dotted line to δ =1 .
40Figure 2. The figur shows how a casino can be represented as a binomial tree. Each
column of nodes corresponds to a particular moment in time. The various nodes within
any given column correspond to the different possible accumulated winnings or losses at
that time. If a node has a black color, then the agent does not gamble at that node. At the
remaining nodes, he does gamble. The arrows pick out two specifi nodes that we refer























Figure 3. The “+” and “*” signs mark the preference parameter triples (α,δ,λ) for which an agent
with prospect theory preferences would be willing to enter a casino offering 50:50 bets to win or lose
a fi ed amount. The agent is naive: he is not aware of the time inconsistency generated by probability
weighting. The “+” signs mark parameter triples for which the agent’s planned strategy is to leave
early if he is winning but to stay longer if he is losing. The “*” signs mark parameter triples for which
theagent’s plannedstrategyistoleave early ifhe islosingbuttostay longerif he iswinning. The blue,
red, green, cyan, magenta, and yellow colors correspond to parameter triples for which λ lies in the
intervals [1,1.5), [1.5,2), [2,2.5), [2.5,3), [3,3.5), and [3.5,4], respectively. The circle marks Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1992) median estimates of the parameters, namely (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .88,0.65,2.25).A
lower value of α means greater concavity (convexity) of the prospect theory value function over gains




Actual behavior Planned behavior
Figure 4. The leftpanelshowsthe strategythata prospecttheoryagentwiththepreference
parameter values (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .95,0.5,1.5) plans to use when he enters a casino offering
50:50 bets to win or lose a fi ed amount. The agent is naive: he is not aware of the time
inconsistency generated by probability weighting. If a node has a black color, then the
agent plans not to gamble at that node. At the remaining nodes, he plans to gamble. The
right panel shows the agent’s actual behavior. If a node has a black color, then the agent























Figure 5. The “+” signs mark the preference parameter triples (α,δ,λ) for which an agent
with prospect theory preferences would be willing to enter a casino offering 50:50 bets
to win or lose a fi ed amount. The agent is sophisticated: he is aware of the time in-
consistency generated by probability weighting. The blue, red, green, and cyan colors
correspond to parameter triples for which λ lies in the intervals [1,1.5), [1.5,2), [2,2.5),
and [2.5,4], respectively. The circle marks Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) median esti-
mates of the parameters, namely (α,δ,λ)=( 0 .88,0.65,2.25). A lower value of α means
greater concavity (convexity) of the prospect theory value function over gains (losses); a
lower δ means more overweighting of tail probabilities; and a higher λ means greater loss
aversion.
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